We consider privacy-preserving algorithms for deep reinforcement learning. State-of-the-art methods that guarantee differential privacy are not extendable to very large state spaces because the noise level necessary to ensure privacy would scale to infinity. We address the problem of providing differential privacy in Q-learning where a function approximation through a neural network is used for parametrization. We develop a rigorous and efficient algorithm by inspecting the reproducing kernel Hilbert space in which the neural network is embedded. Our approach uses functional noise to guarantee privacy, while the noise level scales linearly with the complexity of the neural network architecture. There are no known theoretical guarantees on the performance of deep reinforcement learning, but we gain some insight by providing a utility analysis under the discrete space setting.
Introduction
Increasing interest in reinforcement learning has led to recent advances in a wide range of algorithms (Sutton & Barto, 2018) . While a large part of the advancement has been in the application space of games, the applicability of reinforcement learning extends to other practical cases beyond games, such as personalized recommendations and search engines. Reinforcement learning methods learn from the environment by carrying out an action, receiving rewards observed for that action in a given state, and transitioning to the next state. Observation of the learned policy may reveal sensitive information: strategies in games, or private information about user preferences in more personalized scenarios. Specifically, we address the issue of preserving the privacy of users by protecting the reward function. Indeed, the reward function is a succinct description of the learning task since it reveals the value of actions and thus latent preferences of users. 1 Borealis AI, Edmonton, Canada. Correspondence to: Baoxiang Wang <baoxiang.wang@borealisai.com>.
Our work is motivated by applications where latent user preferences are represented through rewards in an online learning setting. As examples, we may consider contextual recommendations and ads placement. In such applications, the agent attempts to learn the best action, which might be an item recommendation or the placement of an ad, respectively. The reward is a function that reflects the user's latent preferences, such as a rating by the user, for instance. This reward may further be a function of some context, such as the environment the user is in -in the case of personalized ads, the context may include the season, holiday period, user's mood, etc. The reward functions and state space can therefore be continuous, reflecting the large dimension of the problem. In this application, we are interested in protecting the user's latent preferences, and thus the reward functions, while learning the optimal action to take, i.e. the optimal ads to display. In the present paper, we develop an algorithm that ensures differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2006b; Dwork & Roth, 2014) , the standard for preserving privacy in machine learning models, for reinforcement learning in continuous state space.
Our approach is built upon deep Q-learning (Sutton & Barto, 2018; Mnih et al., 2015) where an optimal policy is learned through estimates of the action-value functions, described in Section 3.2. We use function approximation, that is, neural networks to estimate the parameters in Q-learning, and apply differential privacy to Q-learning in order to preserve the privacy of the reward functions. In most of the past work on differentially private mechanisms, the outputs are vectorvalued and privacy is achieved by adding random noise to the model (Beimel et al., 2010; Dwork et al., 2010; Hardt & Talwar, 2010) . In our context, we desire to protect functions, and we aim to achieve privacy by adding perturbation to the Q-function as it is updated in the learning algorithm. We thus add functional noise as taken from sample paths of appropriately parameterized Gaussian processes, to the updates of the action-value function. We consider the kernel of the Gaussian process and the neural network to be embedded in a Sobolev space since it is general enough to include most functions of interest. We rigorously show the privacy guarantees on this Q-learning algorithm. Though there is no known performance analysis on the utility of deep reinforcement learning, we gain some insight by finding the utility guarantee under discrete state space settings.
We make several novel contributions in the present paper. First, we consider privacy in a reinforcement learning framework with continuous state space. As the rewards and states are functions, we cannot use the standard methodology in differential privacy literature where random noise is added to the vector-valued output. Our second contribution then is to add functional noise, taken for sample paths of Gaussian processes, to the released action-value functions. We develop the methodology for determining this functional noise. Finally, we provide some insight into utility guarantees under differential privacy, by considering the tractable discrete case.
In the next section we give a brief overview of related work, followed by a section covering preliminaries on reinforcement learning and differential privacy. In Section 4 we present our model and algorithm, followed by our main result on privacy guarantees. In Section 5 we provide results from numerical experiments on an example use case, and we conclude in the final section.
Related Work
There is very little prior work on differential privacy in the reinforcement learning framework. We discuss here some work on privacy in reinforcement learning and in online learning, along with other relevant work.
Our motivation for this work is the problem of presenting users with personalized offers in a continual manner. Besides reinforcement learning, online learning models such as multi-armed bandits (Szepesvári, 2010 ) have been considered in such scenarios. In the bandit literature a recent work comes close to our work in the sense of perturbing reward functions for privacy in online recommendation applications. In (Gajane et al., 2018) , the authors perturb the rewards in a stochastic multi-armed bandit model. They consider a model where feedback to the user about an arm is separate from the true reward of that arm. They define a corruption function that maps the mean of the reward to the mean of the feedback. The authors then derive regret bounds for this scenario. They define differential privacy on neighboring reward sequences, which is close to our definition on neighboring reward functions. Similar private bandit problem is also studied in (Shariff & Sheffet, 2018) . However, we consider Q-learning and the continuous setting for both the reward and state space, allowing a richer set of applications to be modeled.
Privacy in a Markov Decision Process (MDP) framework has been considered, for instance (Venkitasubramaniam, 2013) . In that work, the author characterizes a privacy measure as the entropy of the posterior distribution induced on the internal state sequence, given a sequence of observed input and output variables. The author then formulates the reward as a weighted sum of the utility (the reward for action in a particular state) and the privacy measure. The objective then is to learn a policy that maximizes this weighted reward. Essentially, the learned policy avoids sequences of input and output variable that reveal extensive information about the underlying state, while achieving some level of utility. Our work doesn't modify the objective of the learning task, but adds noise such that the internal reward function is not revealed, allowing us to provide a clear differential privacy guarantee.
Differential privacy in reinforcement learning has been investigated in the context of policy evaluation (Balle et al., 2016) . The objective is to estimate the value function of an MDP from observed trajectories, by minimizing the square error. The authors provide differential privacy by output perturbation, with the aim of protecting the privacy of the trajectories, such as in medical setting. However, it is commonly regarded that both policy evaluation and policy improvement are the necessary steps for a reinforcement learning algorithm (Sutton & Barto, 2018) . It is not clear how their work can be extended to policy improvement.
While prior work in differential privacy has been focused on methods where the output is a finite-dimensional vector, some recent work (Hall et al., 2013) has studied methods for releasing functions while preserving differential privacy. The authors show that adding appropriately chosen Gaussian process noise to the output function provides differential privacy. We take inspiration from this work for our method of applying functional noise to the action-state value function.
We note that the algorithm for differential privacy in a deep learning framework in (Abadi et al., 2016) can be extended to Q-learning with continuous spaces, but the privacy budget would have to be much larger. In fact, the method exploit the gradient descent structure used to train the neural networks, which is not the most natural solution. It also requires the algorithm to truncate the gradient with respect to each item at each iteration, which hampers the performance of the training. We regard their work as a very general approach for all deep learning frameworks, whose results may be improved given the exact problems.
Preliminaries
The common problem formulation in reinforcement learning is that of maximizing the expected total reward. We consider in particular the framework of value learning where the goal is to optimize a parametrized value function. The optimal value function will then generates the improved policy. We now provide some background on the reinforcement learning framework we consider and on differential privacy.
Markov Decision Process and Reinforcement Learning
Markov decision processes (MDPs) are a framework to make decisions in a stochastic environment. We use canonical settings of the discrete-time Markov decision process. An MDP is denoted by the tuple (S, A, T , r, ρ 0 , γ) which includes the state space S, the action space A = {1, . . . , m}, the stochastic transition kernel T : S × A × S → R + , the reward function r : S × A → R, the initial state distribution ρ 0 : S → R + and the unnormalized discount factor γ ∈ (0, 1]. Denote m in the above to be the number of actions in the action space. We assume that the reward function is bounded by |r(s, a)| < r 0 . The objective is to maximize the cumulative rewards. Further define the policy of the agent as a function π : S, A → R + for a stochastic policy or π : S → A for a deterministic policy. Define the action-state value function as
the expected return after taking action a t at state s t . When the context is clear, we omit π and write Q(s, a) instead.
Our work can be applied to both the discrete state space and the continuous state space settings. In the discrete state space setting, we have S = {1, . . . , n}. The stochastic transition kernel is the probability distribution P(s |s, a), denoted as matrix P a ∈ R n×n (each row sums up to one). We write the reward function as r a ∈ R n , a = 1, . . . , m. In this setting, finding the optimal action-state value function is equivalent to finding the optimal state value function v(s), denoted as a vector v ∈ R n . The Bellman equation for optimal value function is given by v ≥ γP i v + r i for each i = 1, . . . , m.
In the continuous state space setting, we assume without loss of generality that S = [0, 1]. We treat Q(s, a) as a set of m functions Q a (s), where each function is defined on [0, 1]. The reward function is similarly defined as a set of m functions, each defined on [0, 1] as well. We do not assume any particular form for the reward function. The Bellman equation is defined as follows
where the random variable s is defined as the consecutive state after execute action a at state s. The squared difference between the two sides of the Bellman equation is defined as the Bellman error. As developed in (Mnih et al., 2015) , we parameterize Q(s, a) with a function approximator, such as a neural network, to minimize the Bellman error. If the policy is updated purely from the learned value function, our work can be extended in a straightforward manner to the algorithms introduced in prior work in the continuous space setting such as (Mnih et al., 2016) and (Lillicrap et al., 2015) .
Differential Privacy
Differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2006a; has developed into a strong standard for privacy guarantees in data analysis. It provides a rigorous framework for privacy guarantees under various adversarial attacks.
The definition of differential privacy is based on the notion that in order to preserve privacy, data analysis should not differ at the aggregate level whether any given user is present in the dataset or not. This latter condition on the presence of any user is formalized through the notion of neighboring datasets (or databases), where neighboring datasets differ in only one element. Let d, d ∈ D be neighboring datasets such that they differ in one element, that is |d − d | = 1. Definition 1. A randomized mechanism M : D → R satisfies ( , δ)-differential privacy if for any two neighboring datasets d ∼ d and for any subset of outputs E ⊆ R it holds that
For converting vector-valued functions that are outputs from a query (or the output of a machine learning model for some given input), a standard approach is the Gaussian mechanism 1 . An important parameter in this mechanism is the global sensitivity of the output function, the l 2 sensitivity in this case. Definition 2. For all d, d ∈ D, |d − d | = 1, the l 2 global sensitivity of an output w is
The Gaussian mechanism with parameter b adds zero-mean Gaussian noise with variance b to each coordinate of w. Lemma 3 ( (Dwork & Roth, 2014) ). If 0 < < 1 and σ ≥ 2 ln(1.25/δ)GS 2,w / , then w(d)+y is ( ,δ)-differentially private if w is deterministic and y is drawn from N (0, σ 2 I).
In our setting, we will extend this mechanism to functional noise, as explained in the next section.
Differentially Private Q-Learning
We apply privacy to a setting that can be generalized to a variety of learning tasks, the Q-learning framework of reinforcement learning, where the objective is to maximize the action-value function. We use function approximators (i.e. a neural network) parameterized by θ to learn the optimal action-value function. We consider the continuous state space setting, where Q(s, a) is assumed to a set of m functions Q a (s) defined on [0, 1] and similarly the reward is a set of m functions each defined on [0, 1].
Our algorithm
We are interested in preserving the privacy of the environment, in particular, the reward function. We make the deep Q-learning algorithm differentially private by adding noise to the action-value functions. This functional noise is a sample path of an appropriately chosen Gaussian process. When elements of the input dataset are discrete, as discussed in Section 3.2, the sensitivity is bounded as shown in (1), and this parameter determines the Gaussian noise added to achieve privacy. In the continuous setting considered here, we want to examine the sensitivity of the output function Q to changes in the input as reflected in the reward function. As the action-value function varies with the environment, we will consider neighboring inputs to be those environment values (combination of state and action) that result in changes to the reward function from r to some r . Since the reward is sampled according to the state of the environment, we will define sensitivity in terms of the Mahalanobis distance. As the reward function changes from r to r resulting in neighboring inputs, we need to consider the output as over a family of functions Q a (s). The l 2 sensitivity definition cannot be applied here since the randomized mechanism which will be the output is a distribution on the function space. We thus use the Mahalanobis distance in the definition of the sensitivity, as this measure captures best the distance of one point to the rest of the sampled population of points. Our definition of sensitivity (Hall et al., 2013) is shown below in Lemma 5. We then approximate differential privacy by adding Gaussian process noise to the function released by our Q-learning algorithm, as shown in Lemma 6 and Lemma 7.
We present our algorithm for private Q-learning with actionvalue function approximation under the setting of continuous state space in Algorithm 1. We modify the original deep Q-learning algorithm (Mnih et al., 2015) by perturbing the learned value function at each batch update. The noise added to the value function is in the form of Gaussian Process noise, which is represented by its samples stored inĝ in the algorithm. Lines 13-17 calculate the parameters for generating the samples of the noise process and updateĝ accordingly. Note that line 6 ensures that the algorithm samples independent Gaussian Process noise instances for every fixed number of iterations. Once the noise is generated, it is added to the value function in the update. At the end of a batch, stochastic gradient descent (SGD) is used to update Algorithm 1 Differentially Private Q-Learning Algorithm 1: Input: target privacy ( , δ), time horizon T , batch size B, action space size m, learning rate α, total buffer refresh instances J 2: Output: Trained value function Q θ (s, a) 3:
. Within a list, denote s + as the element s links to and s − as the element that links to s. Treat s + = 1 and s − = 0 for non-existence. When
Receive r t and s t+1 , s ← s t+1
12:
Repeat the following 5 steps for each a ∈ [m]: { 13:
Update the listĝ a (s) ← z at } 18: compute z a and updateĝ a [s] [:] 27: end while the parameter θ in line 21. When a query is sent (a call to the released value function), it returns the trained value function with the appropriate noise in line 25. For notational convenience we omit the subscript θ from the parameterized action-value function Q θ (s, a) in Algorithm 1.
Privacy Guarantee
We now derive the privacy guarantee of our algorithm. Our main result is in Theorem 4; we show the efficiency of our algorithm in Corollary 11; and we provide insight on the utility analysis in Corollary 12. It is worth noting that useful tricks such as experience replay buffer can be adapted into our algorithm in a straightforward manner without violating the privacy guarantee. For clarity of exposition, we omit such tricks when the context is clear. We now state our main privacy result.
Theorem 4. The Q-learning algorithm in Algorithm 1 is
is the maximum absolute one-step reward, L is the Lipschitz constant of the value function approximation, B is the batch size and T is the number of iterations.
Theorem 4 provides a rigorous guarantee on the privacy of the reward function. We now provide a series of lemmas in support of the proof of the theorem. In this section, when the context is clear, the integration symbol denotes Lebesgue integration and the derivation symbol denotes weak derivatives. Note that a function being differentiable a.e. does not imply that the function has a weak derivative (a counterexample is the Cantor function, which is thus excluded from H 1 ). Any function equal to ∂f (x) a.e. is considered identical to ∂f (x) in H 1 .
In the following, f (x) refers to the released function of Algorithm 1, the learned action-value function.
Recall that Lemma 3 shows that if 0 < < 1 and σ ≥ 2 ln(1.25/δ)∆/ , then f (x) + y is ( ,δ)-DP. There, ∆, the sensitivity, is defined as max x,x f (x) − f (x ) 2 . In Lemma 5 we define the sensitivity under the Mahalanobis distance.
Lemma 5. With the sensitivity under the Mahalanobis distance defined as ∆ = max x,x M −1/2 (f (x) − f (x )) 2 where M is positive definite symmetric, f (x) + σM 1/2 y is ( ,δ)-DP, with σ ≥ 2 ln(1.25/δ)∆/ and < 1.
Hence, when y ∼ N (0, 1),
The rest of the argument follows the approach in (Dwork & Roth, 2014) p. 261, which is described in the setting of one-dimensional random variables and isotropic M . We show the argument in our setting for completeness. For δ-approximation privacy we would like to have P(c < ) > 1 − δ/2. We consider the following tail bound of the Gaussian distribution: ∀t,
The conditions are further reduced to ln( 2/πδ 2 ) ≤ ln(tσ/∆) + t 2 σ 2 /2∆ 2 and t ≤ − ∆ 2 /2σ 2 , respectively. We insert t = − ∆ 2 /2σ 2 to the first inequality and derive:
per the monotonicity with respect to σ /∆. Hence, it is sufficient that both σ /∆ ≥ 3/2 and σ 2 2 /2∆ 2 − 4/9 are satisfied. The choice σ ≥ 2 ln(1.25/δ)∆/ the immediately follows, as desired.
Along with Lemma 5, we use Lemma 6 from (Hall et al., 2013 )(Proposition 7) to justify the differentially private mechanisms with functional noise.
Lemma 6 ( (Hall et al., 2013) ). If there exists a kernel function K(x, y) such that for any n ≥ 1
where ξ(x) = f (x) − f (x) and K = (K(x i , x j )) ij 0 is the Gram matrix, then the function f and f cannot bedistinguished under δ-approximation, as long as we release the function f + g where σ ≥ 2 ln(1.25/δ)/ and g is a sample path of the Gaussian process G(0, σ 2 K(x, y)).
If both f and f are in the RKHS generated by K, it is
If f and f correspond to the algorithm with some adjacent input datasets and h H ≤ ∆ is satisfied by any such adjacent dataset pairs, the algorithm is ( , δ)-DP.
In Lemma 7 below we introduce the Sobolev space which embeds our neural network and our Gaussian Process noise. We subsequently show that common neural networks lie in that space in Lemma 8.
Lemma 7. We consider the one-dimensional case x ∈ R. Without loss of generality consider the functions defined on [0, 1]. The Sobolev space with order 1 and L 2 -norm i.e. W 1,2 or H 1 , is defined as 2
where ∂f (x) denotes weak derivatives and (·)dx denotes the Lebesgue integration. If H 1 is equipped with inner product
Proof. We modify the standard Sobolev space such that the function is no longer constrained on its border {0, 1}, but the arguments will be similar. It suffices to show that f (x) 2 ≤ c f , f for some c and that H 1 is complete. The former can be seen by showing that for any nonzero f , f , g = 0 if and only if g = 0. By the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality,
We set c = 2β as desired. For the completeness of H 1 , we show that for any sequence {f n } with f n − f n+1 , f n − f n+1 converging to zero, the limit of the sequence is in H 1 . In fact, f n − f n+1 , f n − f n+1 converging to zero indicates that 1 0 (f n − f n+1 )dx converges to zero, which then indicates that {f n (x)} converges pointwise for any x. The claim then follows. We verify that f (y) = f , K y for any function f (y) ∈ H 1 . In fact,
We do not restrict the value of f (0) and f (1), as the value function should not be assumed to have zero value at the boundary.
where u(x) is the sign function and δ(x) is the impulse function. By the Riesz representation theorem, K(x, y) is the unique kernel of H 1 equipped with the inner product f , g defined above.
Lemma 8. Letf (x) denote the neural network with bounded parameters. Forf (x) with arbitrarily many layers, if the gradient of the activation function is bounded (such as a ReLU function, a sigmoid function, or the tanh function),
Proof. Let ψ(x) be the activation function and c be the bound of |∂ψ(x)|. We take the ReLU function ψ(x) = min(0, x − 0.5) (without loss of generality we map the domain to [0, 1]) as an example where c = 1. Letf i denote the function of each layer such thatf i (x) = ψ(w i x + b i ). As per the chain rule we have |∂f (x)| ≤ c Nc i |w i | which is also bounded, where N c is the number of layers. Then,
As we use the Gaussian Process noise in an iterative algorithm, it is important to discuss the composability of the differential privacy guarantee. (Kairouz et al., 2013) shows that the key of the composability is to analyze the moment generating function of the noise distribution. The following Lemma shows an upper bound of the moment generating function of the Gaussian Process with the kernel introduced in Lemma 7.
Lemma 9. Let g ∈ H 1 which indicates that g is continuous a.e. Let P 0 (f ) and P 1 (f ) be the probability measure over H 1 of the sample path generated by G(0, σ 2 K) and G(g, σ 2 K), respectively. The sample path f ∼ P 0 satisfies, for any λ > 0 and for any S,
Proof sketch. We investigate the ratio (P 1 (f (x i ) ∈ S)/P 0 (f (x i ) ∈ S)) on a dyadic rational {x i }. As {x i } is dense and compact, the limit of the ratio approaches the left hand side of the inequality. The complete proof is included in the Appendix.
As our algorithm is iterative, the noise added may affect the privacy guarantee in the subsequent iterations. Though the noise itself is not bounded, we show that with high probability the noise is uniformly bounded. We can then calibrate the δ to cover the O(e −u 2 ) approximation factor.
Lemma 10. Let P the probability measure over H 1 of the sample path g generated by G(0, σ 2 K). Then over
g(x) ≥ 10.34 βσ + u)] ≤ exp(−u 2 /2).
Proof sketch. We investigate investigate a dyadic rational {x i }. We show that the increment of E[max x∈{xi} g(x)] drops geometrically as {x i } expands. Therefore we bound its expectation. The complete proof is included in the Appendix.
We are now ready to prove our main theorem.
Proof of Theorem 4. It follows from Lemma 7 immediately that, in the algorithm for any Q(s, a) and Q (s, a), Q − Q 2 H ≤ 4r 2 0 (1 + β 2 )/(1 − γ) 2 + L 2 /2β, for each a. We show that it is possible to calibrate the noise to drop the 1/(1 − γ) 2 term. To make Q and Q indistinguishable, we inspect the update step. Let Q and Q 0 denote the value function after and before the update, respectively. We have |Q − Q 0 | ≤ αL 2 (r 0 +ĝ a (s t+1 ) −ĝ a (s t+1 ))/B. As per Lemma 10, with probability 1 − exp(−(kr 0 − 10.34 √ βσ) 2 /2), we have |Q − Q 0 | ≤ αL 2 (2k + 1)r 0 /B. By the triangle inequality, for any r and r , the corresponding Q and Q satisfies |Q−Q | ≤ 2αL 2 (2k+1)r 0 /B (given that Q 0 is fixed by the previous step). Let g = Q − Q , we have g 2 H ≤ (1 + β 2 )(2αL 2 (2k + 1)r 0 /B) 2 + L 2 /2β. Let z (a function) be the output of a single update of the algorithm. From Lemma 9, we have:
Since the algorithm is composed of T /B many updates, we denote f T (z) to be the joint distribution of T /B many G(0, σ 2 K) sample paths. We have
.
With arguments similar to those in (Kairouz et al., 2013) ,
so that the first term is e −w and the second term is . This guarantees that P f (S) − e P f (S) ≤ δ which is desired. It suffices to check λ ≥ 0 so that the Lemma holds. In fact, it is true
and find σ ≥ (4T ∆ 2 /B 2 ) ln(e + /δ) as desired.
We now analyse the complexity of our algorithm.
Corollary 11. The value function trained by Algorithm 1 can respond to N q rounds of queries, ( , δ)-privately, in O(log(N q )) time.
Proof sketch. We show that the noise only depends on at most two of its adjacent samples. Then the complexity is induced by insertion, which is O(log(N q )). The complete proof is included in the Appendix.
To the best of our knowledge, there has not been a study to rigorously analyze the utility of deep reinforcement learning. In fact, in the continuous state space setting, the solution of the Bellman equation is not unique. Hence, it is unlikely for Q-learning to achieve a guaranteed performance in general. However, we gain some insight by analyzing the algorithm's learning error in the discrete state space setting. The learning error is defined by the discrepancy between the learned state-value function and the true optimal state-value function. We consider the worst case J = 1 (which is the best case for (δ + exp(−(kr 0 − 51.7 √ β) 2 /2))-approximation differential privacy) where the noise is most correlated through the iterations, and provide an upper bound of the learning error.
Corollary 12. Let v and v * be the value function learned by our algorithm and the optimal value function, respectively. In the case J = 1 and |S| = n < ∞, the utility loss of the algorithm satisfies
Proof sketch. In the dual of a linear program formulation, we show that with a noised objective, the optimality deviates by at most the right hand side in the corollary statement. The complete proof is included in the Appendix.
Discussion
Our results on providing differential privacy in Q-learning can be seen as a preliminary step towards a variety of privacy-preserving mechanisms in the reinforcement learning framework. We now discuss some of the possible extensions.
We first discuss the amenability of our algorithm towards the case where the algorithm learns both a policy function and a value function coordinately. If in the updates of the policy function, only the Q function in the policy gradient estimation is used, for example the policy gradient ∇ θπ ln π(a|s)Q(s, a) in (Mnih et al., 2016) , then the algorithm has the same privacy guarantee. In fact, any post-processing of the private Q function will not break the privacy guarantee. This also includes experience replay and -greedy policies (Mnih et al., 2015) .
However, consider the case where the reward is directly accessed in the policy gradient estimation, for example ∇ θπ ln π(a|s)A(s, a) in (Degris et al., 2012; Schulman et al., 2015) where
In this setting, the privacy guarantee no longer holds. To extend the privacy guarantee to the case, one should add noise to the policy function as well.
We now discuss the extension to high dimensional state spaces. While we present our algorithm in the setting of 1-dimensional state space, it can be extended to highdimension spaces. The kernel function exp(−β|x − y|) introduced in Lemma 7 does not extend to high dimension in a straightforward manner, but one may find other kernel functions to replace the noise generator. Other than the recalibration of the noise level to the new kernel, the lemmas and the theorem still hold. Note, however, that the efficiency derived in Corollary 11 does not extend to other kernel functions in general. Hence, it is not straightforward to make the algorithm as efficient in high-dimensional state space settings. We leave efficient privacy-preserving algorithm for high-dimensional state spaces as an open problem.
Empirical Results
We present empirical results to corroborate our theoretical guarantee and to demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed algorithm on a small example. We test Algorithm 1 using the following MDP environment: S = [0, 1] and the state s denotes the location of the agent. s 0 is uniformly distributed on S. A = {0, 1}. If the agent chooses action 1 (or 0), the agent will randomly move towards the right (or the left) by a random amount sampled uniformly from [0, 0.25]. s will be reset to 1 (or 0), if after the move it is greater than 1 or (less than 0), respectively. The reward 0.5 − |s − 0.5| is given at each step, which encourages the agent to move close to the middle of the in-terval. The MDP terminates at the 50th step. The code is available at https://github.com/wangbx66/ differentially-private-q-learning.
We plot the learning curve with a variety of noise levels and J values in Figure 1 . With the increase of the noise level, the algorithm's takes more samples to achieve the performance of the non-noisy version. However, we observe that with the noise being reset every round (J = T /B), the algorithm is likely to converge with limited sub-optimality (with σ < 0.4, empirically). As J exp(−(kr 0 − 51.7 √ β) 2 /2)) is exponentially small, we suggest using J = T /B in practice, which achieves and almost δ differential privacy guarantee. Figure 1 . Empirical results on differentially private q-learning. The y-axis denotes the cumulative reward (the score). The x-axis is the number of samples the agent has trained on, where each episode of training generates 50 samples. The curve is averaged over 10 random seeds. The areas in shallow colors denote the range of one standard deviation.
Conclusion
We have developed a rigorous and efficient algorithm for differentially private Q-learning in continuous state settings. Our method applies functional noise taken from sample paths of a Gaussian process parameterized appropriately according to sensitivity calculated under the RKHS distance between input reward functions. Different from previous approaches who exploits the SGD structure, we established a natural and general framework of applying differential privacy in continuous state space settings. We believe our approach is general enough to be extended to other domains beyond reinforcement learning.
A. Proof of Lemma 9, 10 and Corollary 11 proof of Lemma 9. We prove the claim by investigating a dyadic rational. We first sampling from [0, 1] the set {x i } 2n+1 , where x i = i/2n, i = 0, . . . , 2n. We define f n0 = (f (x 0 ), f (x 2 ), . . . , f (x 2n )) T and f n1 = (f (x 1 ), f (x 3 ), . . . f (x 2n−1 )) T and β n = β/2n. If f is the sample path from P 0 by definition,
According to the property of multivariate Gaussian variables, the conditional probability of f n1 conditioned on f n0 follows
. Otherwise if f is sampled from P 1 , f n1 |f n0 ∼ N (g n1 + K 10 K −1 00 (f n0 − g n0 ), σ 2 (K 11 − K 10 K −1 00 K T 10 )), where g n0 = (lim x→x0 g(x), lim x→x2 g(x), . . . , lim x→x2n g(x)) T and f n1 = (lim x→x1 g(x), lim x→x3 g(x), . . . lim x→x2n−1 g(x)) T . We omit the steps of calculation, but it is immediately verified that Hence we have K 11 − K 10 K −1 00 K T 10 = 1−exp(−2βn) 1+exp(−2βn) I. The ratio of the probability density
given. With the same argument on K 10 K −1 00 f n0 and K 11 − K 10 K −1 00 K T 10 under n = 1 but fixed β n , we have
Meanwhile,
= exp( 4λ 2 8σ 4 (1 − exp(−2β)) 2 Var ((g(0) − exp(−β)g(1))f (0) + (g(1) − exp(−β)g(0))f (1))) − λ g(0) 2 + g(1) 2 − 2 exp(−β)g(0)g(1) 2σ 2 (1 − exp(−2β)) ) = exp( 4λ 2 8σ 4 (1 − exp(−2β)) 2 (σ 2 (g(0) − exp(−β)g(1)) 2 + σ 2 (g(1) − exp(−β)g(0)) 2 + 2 exp(−β)σ 2 (g(0) − exp(−β)g(1))(g(1) − exp(−β)g(0))) − λ g(0) 2 + g(1) 2 − 2 exp(−β)g(0)g(1) 2σ 2 (1 − exp(−2β)) ) = exp((λ 2 − λ) g(0) 2 + g(1) 2 − 2 exp(−β)g(0)g(1) 2σ 2 (1 − exp(−2β)) )).
Finally, with (♥) follows by cancelling the g(i − 1)g(i) terms, (♦) by relaxing the exponential terms, and z(i) indicating number of bits before the i's last 1-bit, we have
The lemma follows immediately by letting lim n → ∞.
proof of Lemma 10. We reuse the notations in the proof of Lemma 9. We start with the base case E[max f 10 ] ≤ 1 2 E[|z|] ≤ β/πσ, where z ∼ N (0, (1 − exp(−2β))σ 2 ). By the Chernoff bound we have that for n independent Gaussian random variables z 1 , . . . , z n ∼ N (0, σ 2 z ), the expectation E[max z i ] ≤ σ z 2 √ ln n. Denote µ n = E[max f 2 n 0 ]. As f 2 n 0 ∈ f 2 n+1 0 the series µ n is non-decreasing. We derive an upperbound of µ n+1 − µ n . Per Lemma 9, we have f (x 2i−1 ) − exp(−β 2 n ) 1+exp(−2β 2 n ) (f (x 2i−2 )+f (x 2i ))|f (x 2i−2 ), f (x 2i ) ∼ N (0, σ 2 1−exp(−2β 2 n ) 1+exp(−2β 2 n ) ) independently for each i = 1, . . . , 2 n . As the expectation of the maximum is monotonically increasing on the mean and the variance, we replace exp(−β 2 n ) 1+exp(−2β 2 n ) f (x 2i−2 ) + f (x 2i ) by µ n and 1−exp(−2β 2 n ) 1+exp(−2β 2 n ) by β 2 n , respectively. Therefore, with f (x 2i−1 ) ∼ N (µ n , σ 2 β 2 n ) i.i.d for each i, we have E[max f 2 n 1 ] ≤ µ n + 2nβ ln 2/2 n σ. Thus, µ n+1 − µ n ≤ 2(E[max f 2 n 1 ] − µ n ) ≤ 8nβ ln 2/2 n σ. By induction we have µ n ≤ β/πσ + ∞ i=0 8iβ ln 2/2 i σ < 10.34 √ βσ. As the dyadic rational is dense and compact on [0, 1], the lemma follows (Lalley, 2013) , Theorem 3.
proof of Corollary 11. We consider the n-th query, where the previous n − 1 queries have been computed and stored. Let x 1 , . . . , x n−1 be the previous queries and g(x 1 ), . . . , g(x n−1 ) the sample. Without loss generality assume that x 1 ≤ . . . , ≤ x n−1 , as it takes at most O(log(n)) time to insert the n-th element into an already sorted list. With similar arguments as in Lemma 9, we observe that as K 10 K −1 00 has only two non-zero elements in each row, both K 10 K −1 00 and (K 11 −K 10 K −1 00 K T 10 ) depend on only the adjacent (at most two) element of x n . To be specific, the mean and standard deviation follows µ at and d at in the algorithm and can be computed in constant time. The corollary follows.
B. Proof of Corollary 12
Our utility analysis is based on the linear program formulation under discrete state spaces (De Farias & Van Roy, 2002; Chen & Wang, 2016) and the sensitivity of linear programs (Hsu et al., 2014) . For each action a, let P a ∈ R n×n be the known, transition matrix as defined in the preliminary. Let r a be the reward signal r(s, a) which is vectorized with respect to the state. Let v be the value function defined on the finite state set, v is optimal if and only if v(s) = max a r(s, a) + s +γP(s |s, a)v(s ).
In fact, the 'if' relation is immediate, and the 'only if' relation is shown in (Sutton & Barto, 2018) . By exhausting the action set under the max above and number the actions from 1 to m, the Bellman equation is formulated it into the below system
where e is the all-one vector and e T v is the dummy objective. The dual of the linear program (2) is maximize λ1,...,λm i λ T i r i subject to i (I − γP T i )λ i = e, λ i ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , m.
We consider the discrete version of Algorithm 1. The Gaussian process noise degenerates to its special case of multivariate Gaussian noise. It is also observed that adding noise to the value function is equivalent to adding noise to the reward function, as they are additive in the update. With J = 1, it is the same sample of noise through the training process. Per (Sutton & Barto, 2018) , the algorithm converge to the optimal value function under the noised reward function. Formally, given the transition matrices and the noised reward signal r i = r i + z i for i = 1, . . . , m where z i ∼ N (0, σ 2 I), we show that Algorithm 1 generates a policy function π(·) and a value function v such that
is satisfied. In the above, v and v * are the optimal value function under the reward r and r, respectively. v and v * are therefore the solution of the system (2) under the reward r and r, respectively.
Claim 13 ((De Farias & Van Roy, 2002) and (Chen & Wang, 2016) ). There exists an optimal dual solution λ * i , i = 1, . . . , m, an optimal deterministic policy π * (·) and the corresponding transition matrix P * such that i λ * i = (I − γP * T ) −1 e, and the k-th entry of λ * i equals the k-th entry of i λ * i if π * (k) = i, and zero otherwise.
